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FUN WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
A GAME FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES
Adam Babich*
The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can
implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare
and change business’ profitability or even viability.1 Nonetheless, it can seem
like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings
in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the
courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doc-
trines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step”2 or “Chevron step
zero.”3 To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in lin-
guistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure the real
issues.4 Grammatical arguments about things like the “rule of the last ante-
cedent” abound, and they rarely serve to make clear language any clearer, or
to clarify ambiguous language.5 At its worst, this type of analysis frustrates
* Adam Babich teaches administrative law at Tulane University Law School and directs
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic.
1. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1208 (5th
Cir. 1991) (vacating a “staged ban of most commercial uses of asbestos” that EPA based on a
finding “that asbestos constituted an unreasonable risk to health and the environment.”).
Dean Ian Holloway argues:
It can be fun for our colleagues to poke fun at administrative law. And even the
most zealous scholar in our field is forced to admit that the questions with which
we occupy ourselves can often seem highly arcane. But I tell students that, in fact,
administrative law is probably one of the two or three most important courses they
will take in law school. . . . [T]he tentacles of the administrative state still reach so
deeply into our day-to-day lives. . . . [Further,] the rights enshrined in the corpus
of administrative law amount to a right to be taken seriously by the government,
which in a democratic state is the most important civil right of all.
Ian Holloway, “A Bona Fide Attempt”: Chief Justice Sir Owen Dixon and the Policy of Deference to
Administrative Expertise in the High Court of Australia, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 697-98 (2002).
2. See Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 706 F.3d 499, 503 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). For a summary of the Chevron two-step test, see infra notes 35-38 and accompa-
nying text.
3. Matadin v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (Walker, J., concurring in the
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006)).
4. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 111 (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of laying down a “smokescreen”).
5. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In Barnhart, the Court determined that it is reasonable to deny disability benefits to
people whose disability prevents them from working at any available job based on the “ ‘rule
of the last antecedent,’ according to which a limiting clause or phrase (here, the relative
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one goal of the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking: preventing agency
officials “from cowering behind bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo.”6 In this con-
text, it is not surprising to see courts treat legislative goals and public policy
as all but irrelevant to their decisions.7 Perhaps because much of the popula-
clause ‘which exists in the national economy’) should ordinarily be read as modifying only
the noun or phrase that it immediately follows (here, ‘any other kind of substantial gainful
work’).” Id. Lengthy analyses that purport to shed light on whether a statutory phrase is or is
not ambiguous are almost inherently suspect. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S.
at 93-98 (providing a more-than-ten-paragraph analysis to find ambiguity in the “literal lan-
guage” of a short statutory phrase); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 43
(1990) (White, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority required “more than 10 pages”
to find that a statutory provision was “clear and unambiguous”); cf. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The sheer surfeit of factors that the Court
was required to consider in this case should arouse the suspicion that something is seriously
amiss with our jurisprudence in this area.”). Despite the masterful obfuscation of the Zuni
majority’s “literal language” analysis, Justice Stevens suggested “a more direct route to the
Court’s patently correct conclusion [that the agency’s regulation was consistent with congres-
sional intent],” arguing that a “policy-driven interpretation” is appropriate as long as the
“driving policy is faithful to the intent of Congress (or, as in this case, aims only to give
effect to such intent)—which it must be if it is to override a strict interpretation of the text—
[in which case] the decision is also a correct performance of the judicial function.” 550 U.S.
at 105-06 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d
321, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
7. See Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1227
(11th Cir. 2009) (deferring to an interpretation which creates a regulatory gap that “may
seem inconsistent with the lofty goals of the Clean Water Act” because it is “no more so [i.e.,
inconsistent with these lofty goals]” than to allow other gaps in coverage that “we know the
Act does.”). The court essentially threw up its hands at the prospect of ever understanding
statutory purposes, explaining that:
[T]he legislative process serves as a melting pot of competing interests and a face-
off of battling factions. What emerges from the conflict to become the enactment
is often less pure than the preamble promises. The provisions of legislation reflect
compromises cobbled together by competing political forces and compromise is
the enemy of single-mindedness.
Id.
The Friends of the Everglades court cited In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir.
2008), for the proposition that courts “interpret and apply statutes, not congressional pur-
poses,” and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998), for the recogni-
tion that “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which [courts] are governed.”
In Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 886 F.2d 355, 362-63 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), the court upheld a regulation that would sometimes require companies to treat
hazardous waste to levels beyond drinking water standards before placing that waste in a
hazardous-waste landfill. In other words, waste would sometimes have to be cleaner than
water suitable for drinking before it could be placed in a landfill. Noting, inter alia, that EPA
considers cost when setting drinking water standards but not when developing the disposal-
in-a-landfill standards at issue, the court deferred to an interpretation that, on its face, ap-
pears to defy common sense.
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tion has already written lawyers off as idiots and leeches,8 there is little
public outrage at the spectacle of courts resolving important public issues in
terms that only lawyers can understand.9 And even lawyers do not necessa-
rily take these doctrines seriously.10
The ideas that animate administrative law jargon are far from nonsensi-
cal, although they tend to elevate the question of “turf” to a more prominent
role in judicial decisionmaking than might be desirable. But the “turf” issue
is important: When the legislative meaning of regulatory legislation is in
dispute, “Who [d]ecides?”11 The courts, whose “province and duty [is] to say
what the law is”?12 Or agencies, to which Congress has arguably “dele-
gated . . . the authority to interpret [legislative] ambiguities with the force
of law”?13 Understandably, some judges do not trust agency bureaucrats to
advance congressional policies without relatively strict supervision, warning
8. Cf. Wilson v. Washington, 138 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Only lawyers would
ignore all common sense and dispute the meaning of ‘the.’ ”); David Barnhizer, Abandoning
an “Unethical” System of Legal Ethics, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 347, 349 (2012) (“At this point in
American history, lawyers seem to be the only ones who think well of their profession.”);
Jonathan J. Lerner, Putting the “Civil” Back in Civil Litigation, N.Y. ST. B.A.J., Mar.-Apr.
2009, at 33, 33 (“[U]nflattering associations with vile creatures such as bloodsucking leeches
seem reserved for lawyers . . .”).
9. See Tom Leahy, This Year’s Charge! For Section Officers, 81 ILL. B.J. 348, 348 (1993)
(evoking “the faces of the public who mistrust and distrust our profession,” the author states
that these “are faces of ordinary people (probably a lot of our own relatives!) who believe the
legal profession was made by lawyers and for lawyers, and that only lawyers can understand
and work within it.”); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 6-7 (1993) (sug-
gesting that judicial use of some “linguistic principles to justify their decisions, without any
explanation of why one principle was chosen instead of another” can result in “a perceived
lack of candor”).
10. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 97 (2011) (“I now share the view of many scholars that courts
will never announce a doctrine that cannot accommodate the powerful tendency of judges
and Justices to act in ways that are consistent with their strongly held political and ideologi-
cal perspectives.”).
11. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 536 F.3d 673, 681 (2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting); see also E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the
Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2005)
(“Chevron and its progeny created a fundamental change in the rules of the power struggle
between the courts and executive agencies.”).
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that,
“[h]eedless of the original design of the APA, [courts] have developed an elaborate law of
deference” which tasks courts with deciding “whether the law means what the agency says it
means.”).
13. City of Arlington, Texas v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Justice Scalia has explained his view that
some court discussion of delegation is really about “a fictional, presumed intent [to delegate,
which] operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.”
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of “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.”14
Bureaucrats, left to their own devices, may become subject to “capture”15
and “hubris.”16 But other judges do not trust their comrades on the bench.
In this view, judges—if afforded too much interpretive latitude—are likely
to end up imposing their own policies as law, since even “[i]ntellectual hon-
esty does not exclude a blinding intellectual bias.”17 Because neither bureau-
crats nor judges are inherently trustworthy,18 these differences seem
unlikely to be resolved soon. But to a large degree, the differences are
papered over by confining interpretative analyses to the famous Chevron
doctrine, which at key points employs vague language that can support con-
flicting views.19 Nonetheless, a Supreme Court majority purports to believe
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
517 (1989).
14. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
15. “‘Agency capture,’ as explained by legal scholars, is the undesirable scenario where
the regulated industry gains influence over the regulators, and the regulators end up serving
the interests of the industry, rather than the general public.” Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
865 F.2d 395, 418 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Anti-
trust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724-26 (1986); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-87, 1713-15 (1975)).
16. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 311 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It
is not the EPA’s prerogative to disregard statutory limitations on its discretion because it
concludes that other remedies it has created out of whole cloth are better.”); Brungart v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The rule of law in general,
and separation of powers principles in particular, require that . . . administrative hubris be
reined in, and that the task of improving the basic provisions of statutes be left to the same
body that wrote them in the first place.”); Se. Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 761,
767 (5th Cir. 1980) (condemning “bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of power with
reason”).
17. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 116-17 (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (noting that “once one departs from ‘strict interpretation of the text’ . . .
fidelity to the intent of Congress is a chancy thing” and that “what judges believe Congress
‘meant’ (apart from the text) has a disturbing but entirely unsurprising tendency to be
whatever judges think Congress must have meant, i.e., should have meant.”).
18. See, e.g., Bob Warren, Slidell City Council Takes Exception to N.O. Inspector General’s
Comments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 17, 2013 (reporting on elected officials’ out-
rage over the New Orleans Inspector General’s suggestion that “the world is full of ‘thieves
and liars’ and that some in that class are attracted to government work.”).
19. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010) (“Chevron’s
multiple meanings make analysis of Chevron very difficult.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Su-
preme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Adminis-
trative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995) (noting that the Supreme Court “has not
applied the Chevron test in a consistent manner”); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83, 112 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Court has vacillated between a
purely literal approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks
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that the Chevron doctrine stands between relative predictability and
“chaos.”20
Does administrative law doctrine offer predictability?21 Well—it is un-
deniable that the doctrine embodies and reinforces a long-standing22 judi-
cial reluctance to lightly dismiss the interpretations of the agencies that
Congress has charged with implementing regulatory programs.23 This is no
small thing; it means at minimum that the government has an advantage in
complicated or confusing cases. The more administrative law cases resemble
“scary math problem[s],”24 the more likely judges are to defer.25 But aside
guidance from historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the purpose
that motivated the legislation”).
20. City of Arlington, Texas v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
21. Sometimes it clearly does. Like any category of law, administrative law contains its
fair share of reasonably straightforward rules. For example, courts presume that administra-
tive decisions not to bring enforcement actions are “committed to agency discretion by law”
and therefore unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 834-35 (1985) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). Similarly, “any waiver of the
National Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocal.” Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio,
503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (citations omitted).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762-63 (1877) (“The construction
given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the
most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.”); Nat’l
Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979) (stating that when
a term is “so general . . . as to render an interpretive regulation appropriate,” the court
“customarily defers to the regulation, which, if found to implement the congressional man-
date in some reasonable manner, must be upheld”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 955 (1992) (noting that a cannon which “militates in favor of accepting
an agency’s construction of a statute as long as the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to admit
of that construction” dates “at least as far back as the New Deal”).
23. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1036 (1990) (finding “a dramatic
decrease in substantive law remands following Chevron, and that the number of remands in
other [e.g., procedural] categories remained constant”).
24. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 111 (2007) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“This case is not a scary math problem; it is a straightforward matter of
statutory interpretation.”).
25. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of
the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 73 (2013) (“Step two of Chevron remains a
mystery, beyond the observation that agencies usually win when they get to it.”).
Acronyms can go a long way toward draining legal arguments of human interest and
helping them sound like “scary math problems.” See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 111
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, for a government lawyer defending an (hypothetical)
agency approval of a highway project that might disproportionately affect members of a
minority group, why use the term “environmental justice” more than necessary? The phrase
can be quickly defined as “EJ”—which has a bloodless, non-threatening tone to it. See, e.g.,
Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ. Dev. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 858 F. Supp. 2d 839, 860 (E.D.
Mich. 2012) (“Putting aside whether LASED has the right to mount an EJ challenge under
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from this bias toward deference to government decisions, it is questionable
whether administrative law doctrine is often outcome-determinative.26 Even
judges with carefully constructed philosophies about the doctrine have a
tendency to ignore those philosophies when the result is important
enough.27 Further, U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports the idea that
courts may abandon deference when they deem the issues sufficiently im-
portant.28 Specifically, the Court expects Congress to “speak clearly [as op-
posed to ambiguously] if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
NEPA, the argument that the FHWA ‘predetermined’ the location of the DRIC is not
borne out by the AR.”). Similarly, there may be little need to refer repeatedly to a “highway”
running through someone’s neighborhood, which might sound distressingly real. Why not
call it a “LULU,” and move the case to a higher level of abstraction? See, e.g., Lydia B. Duff,
Beyond Environmental LULUs: Thoughts of an Urban Environmental Lawyer, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 49, 49 (1994). From the government’s perspective, you may not wish the facts
and equities to distract the court from principles of deference “to the ‘informed discretion’
of deciding agencies.” See, e.g., Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ. Dev., 858 F. Supp. 2d at 849
(citations omitted). The flip side of course, is that lawyers who challenge the government
should seek to tell their clients’ stories clearly and in English (without ignoring the adminis-
trative law principles that the court will need to justify a result). For example, if you bring a
lawsuit to protect asthmatic children from air pollution, would you rather talk about “health
protection standards” or “NAAQS”? Cf., e.g., Mississippi v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 744 F.3d
1334, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing the stringency of “NAAQS”).
26. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 19, at 783 (“Chevron is so pliable that courts applying
it can still reach any desired result . . . .”); Scalia, supra note 13, at 521 (explaining that
because [Justice Scalia] usually finds statutes clear from their text and their “relationship
with other laws,” it is “relatively rare that Chevron will require [him] to accept an interpreta-
tion which, though reasonable, [he] would not personally adopt.”).
27. Justice Scalia, for example, is the U.S. Supreme Court’s most eloquent champion of
deference to “authoritative” agency interpretations, advocating for deference even to the in-
terpretations that the U.S. Justice Department advances in briefs on behalf of client agen-
cies. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 259 n.6 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet
Justice Scalia joined the majority in Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000), denying deference to the Federal Drug Administration’s
interpretation of the statutory term “drug” as broad enough to include tobacco when the
statute defined that term to include “articles (other than food) intended to affect the struc-
ture or any function of the body,” 529 U.S. at 126. The Court employed a wide-ranging
analysis to interpret statutory words “in their context,” including the context of “other Acts”
and “common sense,” and to construe the law “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory
scheme.” 529 U.S. at 132-33 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
28. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159 (“In extraordinary cases,
however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such
an implicit delegation.”) (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Pol-
icy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986), for the proposition that courts “may also ask whether
the legal question is an important one.”); id. at 160 (“Congress could not have intended to
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion.”).
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‘economic and political significance.’ ”29 And as the Seventh Circuit noted
in a different context: “ ‘significance’ often lies in the eye of the
beholder.”30
If administrative law doctrines do not actually determine outcomes,
they nonetheless create a risk of confusing advocates and causing them to
give short-shrift to the persuasive power of their clients’ stories and the
equities that underlie their cases.31 Experienced lawyers know, however, not
to put all of their eggs in the basket of dry, administrative law doctrine.32
This can be verified by looking behind the judicial rulings and reading the
briefs in administrative law cases. While good lawyers are careful to show
courts how administrative law principles can be used to express a ruling in
their favor, they do not neglect to show—as a matter of policy, truth, and
justice—why their favored result is best.33
29. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)
(citations omitted).
30. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005). For example,
dissenting in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Justice Breyer noted that even if there were
a rule that required “in close cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’
should be made by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected
agency administrators[,]” such a rule would not “control[ ] the outcome” in a case about
whether the FDA had authority to regulate tobacco as a drug. 529 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
31. Cf. Beermann, supra note 19, at 837 (arguing that Chevron provides “courts with a
mechanism for reducing their accountability by hiding their decisions approving agency ac-
tion behind a veneer of deference”).
32. For related reasons, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn explained as part of his “Seven
ABC’s of Appellate Argument” that “it is in the statement of the facts that the advocate has
his first, best, and most precious access to the court’s attention.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 237-38 (1960). This is, in part, because there is
usually “an equally perfect technical case to be made on [either] side.” Id. at 237. Thus, a
persuasive case should make sense not only in terms of doctrine, but also “in simple terms of
life and justice.” Id. at 238.
33. For example, in Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1995), the court overturned EPA’s decision not to grant a waiver to allow sale of a gasoline
fuel additive, MMT. The court based its ruling on step one of the Chevron test. Specifically,
the court held that EPA violated the Act’s “clear terms . . . in denying Ethyl a waiver for
MMT on public health grounds.” Id. This is because the Act’s “plain language . . . makes
clear that waiver decisions are to be based on one criterion: a fuel additive’s effect on emis-
sion standards.” Id. at 1058. Thus, “[i]n basing her waiver decision on the public health
implications of MMT, the [EPA] Administrator acted contrary to the plain language of [the
relevant statutory provision].” Id. Because the court’s ruling flowed from unambiguous con-
gressional direction, the administrative law novice might expect that the legal briefs before
the court would have been short, dry, and focused on statutory interpretation. Not so. The
petitioner’s fifty-seven-page brief does, of course, stress the Act’s limited criterion. See Brief
for Petitioner at 4-40, Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-1505), (1994 WL 16182838). But the brief also takes more than fifteen pages to
show that EPA’s approach to its “public health” analysis was unfair, unscientific, and
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In sum, administrative law jurisprudence tends to boil down to a body
of judicial opinions that serve poorly to enlighten or sharpen public dis-
course. Many administrative law opinions read as if they were in code, de-
signed to obscure rather than illuminate the considerations driving the
result. For lawyers, however, the doctrine boils down to a flexible tool for
advocacy—a language capable of justifying whatever result the advocate fa-
vors. Although the doctrine’s gist appropriately favors deference to the gov-
ernment in close cases, it supplies a counter-argument to almost any
opponent’s argument. In this respect, the doctrine is reminiscent of a chil-
dren’s game, known as “fortunately/unfortunately,” which involves some va-
riation of the following recitation:
Unfortunately, a man fell out of an airplane. Fortunately, there was
a haystack in the field below. Unfortunately, there was a pitchfork
in the haystack. Fortunately, the man missed the pitchfork. Unfor-
tunately, he missed the haystack.
For lawyers, of course, what is unfortunate in one case may be fortunate
in the next. Therefore, for our purposes, the doctrine is more appropriately
phrased in value-neutral terms, i.e., “on one hand” and “on the other.” If we
were to succumb to the lure of legal analysis that focuses on the “two step”
and the “zero step” and begin to treat administrative law as a game, it might
look something like this:
Instructions: Select the principles that support your case or the re-
sult you wish to reach. If you notice an administrative law principle
that is contrary to your preferred result, don’t worry! There is
likely to be a contrary principle in the next column.34
“smack[ed] of Orwellian ‘doublespeak,’ ” and that, in fact, there is no evidence that MMT
presented a significant threat to public health. See id. at 41-55 (the “Orwellian doublespeak”
quote is on page fifty-one of the brief). Why did the petitioners bother? The petitioners’
lawyers presumably wanted the court to feel comfortable that it was reaching the correct
result in terms of justice and good public policy. In other words, they were presumably not
confident that having the best side of a Chevron step-one argument would be enough. Fur-
ther, those parts of the petitioner’s argument that focused on fairness, science, and public
policy had a logical function in the brief as a fallback “arbitrary and capricious” argument
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Id. at 52 (“EPA’s denial of Ethyl’s application on the basis of
this record is arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside.”).
34. Professor Karl N. Llewellyn used a similar chart to demonstrate that “there are two
opposing canons [of statutory construction] on almost every point.” LLEWELLYN, supra note 32,
at 521. He explained, “to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction
contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon . . . .” Id.
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On one hand: On the other:
• Courts review agency interpretations of • The Chevron two-step analysis only
regulatory laws by applying the Chevron applies when [1] “Congress delegated
two-step test: “First, always, is the authority to the agency generally to make
question whether Congress has directly rules carrying the force of law, and [2]
spoken to the precise question at issue. If that the agency interpretation claiming
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the deference was promulgated in the exercise
end of the matter . . . . [Second, if] the of that authority.”37 Otherwise, the
court determines Congress has not appropriate degree of judicial deference
directly addressed the precise question at depends on the “the thoroughness evident
issue, the court does not simply impose in [the agency’s] consideration, the
its own construction on the statute . . . . validity of its reasoning, its consistency
Rather, if the statute is silent or with earlier and later pronouncements,
ambiguous with respect to the specific and all those factors which give it power
issue, the question for the court is to persuade, if lacking power to
whether the agency’s answer is based on a control.”38
permissible construction of the statute.”35 Further, courts need “accept [as
An agency’s view of ambiguous statutory reasonable] only those agency
language “governs if it is a reasonable interpretations that are reasonable in light
interpretation of the statute—not of the principles of construction courts
necessarily the only possible normally employ.”39
interpretation, nor even the interpretation
deemed most reasonable by the courts.”36
• “[I]f the language of the statute is open • But courts apply “traditional tools of
or ambiguous . . . then [the court] must statutory construction” to ascertain
uphold the [agency’s] interpretation as whether there is ambiguity, i.e., whether
long as it is reasonable.”40 “Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue.”41 And there is no
definitive list of these “traditional
tools.”42 Further, “plain meaning, like
35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
36. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2009) (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843-44).
37. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
38. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
39. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (rejecting an interpretation that relied on cases that the Court had
disapproved).
40. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
41. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
42. See Lawson & Kam, supra note 25, at 74 (“Professor Lawson has been waiting for
almost thirty years for a court to openly acknowledge there is some uncertainty about how to
determine the ‘clear’ meaning of a statute—and he is still waiting patiently.”); Craig Allen
Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1509 n.246 (1995).
Arguably, this is all for the good. If we wanted the legal system to resolve disputes according
to rigid rules, we presumably could replace judges with computers. Because judges “are not
automata,” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951),
we expect them to apply their wisdom to traditional and evolving tools of legal and factual
analysis, tempered by a humble appreciation of the judiciary’s limited role in making policy.
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beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the
beholder.”43
• Where statutory text is “not crystalline,” • “In determining whether Congress has
deference to a reasonable construction is specifically addressed the question at
appropriate.44 issue, a reviewing court should not
confine itself to examining a particular
statutory provision in isolation. . . . It is a
fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme. . . . A court must therefore
interpret the statute as a symmetrical and
coherent regulatory scheme and fit, if
possible, all parts into an harmonious
whole. Similarly, the meaning of one
statute may be affected by other Acts,
particularly where Congress has spoken
subsequently and more specifically to the
topic at hand.”45
• “The plain meaning of legislation should • “[E]xcept in the ‘rare cases [in which]
be conclusive . . . .”46 the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of its drafters.’ ”47
See id. (“The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high
competence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its
work.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14
(1983) (“Marbury’s justification for judicial review, grounded as it is in the ‘ordinary and
humble judicial duty’ of the common law courts, seems necessarily to entail a general
obligation of independent law-exposition by article III courts. This is what courts ‘do’; it is
their ‘job.’ ”).
43. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985); see also Jacob E.
Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron As A Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 705 (2007) (arguing
that “whether deference will be given in practice is a function of heterogeneous interpretive
methods used by individual judges and divergent views about the degree of clarity in
statutes”).
44. See New Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
45. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-
33 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (applying post-hoc legislative
history to determine the unambiguous meaning of a statute); see also MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (stating that “a meaning set forth in a single
dictionary” that differs from “virtually all other” dictionary definitions is not sufficient to
create ambiguity).
46. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
47. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
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• “The power of executing the laws . . . • Courts routinely construe the “owner
does not include a power to revise clear and operator” language of 42 U.S.C.
statutory terms that turn out not to work § 9607(a)(1) as “owner or operator” where
in practice.”48 there is “no rational explanation, other
than careless statutory drafting, for
imposing liability upon ‘owners or
operators’ under one section but only
holding ‘owners and operators’ liable
under another section.”49
• “The fact that the agency has from time • “An agency interpretation of a relevant
to time changed its interpretation” does provision which conflicts with the
not mean “that no deference should be agency’s earlier interpretation is entitled
accorded . . . .” Thus, an “initial agency to considerably less deference than a
interpretation is not instantly carved in consistently held agency view.”51
stone.” Instead, the agency must consider
“the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis.”50
• Agencies must “examine the relevant • But if the law required agencies to re-
data.”52 think decisions every time “some new
circumstance has arisen, some new trend
has been observed, or some new fact
discovered, there would be little hope that
the administrative process could ever be
consummated in an order that would not
be subject to reopening.”53 Further, “[i]t
is well settled that an agency need not
reopen administrative proceedings merely
because some new piece of evidence has
come to light that was not before the
agency at the time it made its decision.”54
48. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014). In
that same case, however, the Court approvingly cited EPA’s tendency to interpret the Clean
Air Act’s phrase “any pollutant” to include only some pollutants, since “the Act is far from a
chef d’oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship.” 134 S. Ct. at 2441.
49. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990); see
also SOLAN, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the “and/or rule,” under which courts sometimes
treat these conjunctions as interchangeable to correct common drafting errors).
50. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64
(1984).
51. Immigration & Nationality Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30
(1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
52. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
53. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
554-55 (1978) (quoting Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 514
(1944)).
54. Am. Mining Cong. v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 1982).
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• An agency “typically has wide latitude in • “[T]he agency must explain the evidence
determining the extent of data-gathering which is available, and must offer a
necessary to solve a problem.”55 ‘rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.’ Generally,
one aspect of that explanation would be a
justification for [acting in the face of
uncertainty] before engaging in a search
for further evidence.”56
• The doctrine of stare decisis has “ ‘special • But a “court’s prior judicial construction
force’ . . . with regard to questions of of a statute trumps an agency construction
statutory interpretation . . . .”57 otherwise entitled to Chevron deference
only if the prior court decision holds that
its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.”58 A contrary rule “would
‘lead to the ossification of large portions
of our statutory law.’”59
• A party challenging an administrative • But an agency has a “preexisting duty to
rule must “exhaust its administrative examine key assumptions as part of its
remedies before seeking judicial review.”60 affirmative burden of promulgating and
explaining a non-arbitrary, non-capricious
rule” and the agency “must justify that
assumption even if no one objects to it
during the comment period.”61
55. Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 167 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
56. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 52 (citation omitted) (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
57. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (citation
omitted) (quoting John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008)).
58. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
59. Id. at 983 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
60. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1987).
61. Okla. Dept. of Envtl. Quality v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 740 F.3d 185, 192 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth.
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 358 F.3d 936, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (party that failed to exhaust
administrative remedies did not forfeit a challenge to a key assumption underlying and
administrative rule).
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• Courts “have recognized two distinct • If “some other party has put an
species of exhaustion requirements: (1) objection on the record, the obligation to
non-jurisdictional exhaustion, which is a exhaust [administrative remedies] is
judicially created doctrine requiring discharged.”63
parties who seek to challenge agency
action to exhaust available administrative
remedies before bringing their case to
court; and (2) jurisdictional exhaustion,
which arises when Congress requires
resort to the administrative process as a
predicate to judicial review.”62
• “The task of the reviewing court is to • Particularly when “the procedural
apply the appropriate APA standard of validity” of agency action is “in serious
review . . . to the agency decision based question,” it may “sometimes be
on the record the agency presents to the appropriate to resort to extra-record
reviewing court.”64 information to enable judicial review to
become effective.”65 Also, at times “[t]o
ignore [specific extra-record] facts is to
ignore reality. For the law to have any
credibility or respect, it must be grounded
in reality.”66
So what is the prize for winners? Ideally, the game will help all players
internalize the fact that—aside from its role in reinforcing the traditional
principle of deference to agencies charged with carrying out Congress’
schemes—administrative law doctrine is a language, not a generator of re-
sults. Advocates must be steeped in the doctrine, of course, and use it to
highlight a path to the results they seek. But the bottom line remains: What
is your client’s story? Why do truth, justice, and the American way demand
that your client prevail? Your results may vary.
62. Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. v. United States, 684 F.3d 149, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
63. Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 820
(1977).
64. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985).
65. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
66. Holy Cross v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 455 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. La.
2006).
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